Belichick's Call

Patriots football? Sure seems a little out place here, but with all the buzz surrounding Belichick's 4th down call I had to get into the mix. Here we go:

Bill Belichick’s gutsy call to go for it on 4th and 2 from the Pats’ 29 has become the most talked about coaching decision of the 2009 NFL season, and one of the most controversial calls in recent memory. Up by six points with just over two minutes to go, Belichick kept the punt team on the sideline and sent his future Hall-of-Fame quarterback on the field to try and dethrone the Colts from the ranks of the unbeaten. One turnover-on-downs and a Peyton Manning touchdown later, and the Patriots were facing a 35-34 deficit with 13 seconds to play.

The call-heard-round-the-world has been the buzz of the sports world in the days following the Patriots’ loss, and the question lingers: was it the right call? Despite a rash of criticism thrown Belichick’s way from fans and analysts across the country, a look at the stats supporting the call makes it hard to dispute his decision.

According to advancednflstats.com, the NFL average for converting on a fourth-and-two from that field position is a 60%. A conversion would have essentially sealed up the victory for the Pats and the odds for completing it based on the NFL average were in their favor.

Given that New England has an above average offense, it’s fair to say that their odds of completing the fourth-and-two would be higher than the NFL average. For argument’s sake, let’s say they get a 10% boost over the league average, which bumps their chance of converting to 70%.

Following a completion, they could have run out the clock and punted the ball with about 20 seconds to go, leaving the Colts with about 70 yards to go and no time outs, needing a touchdown to win. Or, if they got another first down on the ground, they could have held on to the ball until the clock reached zero.

Belichick also knew the risk involved in the call. If the Patriots don’t complete the pass, the Colts get the ball at the 29 yard line with over two minutes to go and a time out remaining. Against a high-powered Colts offense, this seems to spell certain defeat.

But again, the odds were in Belichick’s favor. According to advancednflstats.com, teams that need a touchdown to tie or take the lead from that field position with two minutes or less to go will score the touchdown 53% if the time. If we give the Colts an offensive boost equal to New England’s, which seems fair and maybe more generous since they needed a touchdown as opposed a short conversion, this number would increase to 63%.

In a case of risk vs. reward, Belichick’s decision was not as off-the-cuff as many critics make it seem. The odds for the Patriots to complete the 4th and 2 and just about seal the victory were greater than the odds for the Colts to score the go-ahead touchdown, even with the short field.
If Belichick had felt that the risk of not converting and giving the Colts a short field wasn’t worth the risk, he would have punted.

But looking at numbers, punting was actually the worst of the two options. Advancednflstats.com estimates that an average punt from the 28 yard line has a net gain of 38 yards. An average punt would have left the Colts at their own 34 yard line. From this field position, the NFL average for scoring with two minutes to go is 30%. When you add the bonus of the Colts offense, this increases to 40%.

When looking at league averages, the odds of the Patriots winning were better if they had punted (70% vs. 60%). And in a matchup of two average NFL teams, you’ll see the punt just about every time. But this wasn’t an average offense that would be getting the ball back. It was the Colts’ methodical two-minute offense, led by the master of the two-minute offense, Peyton Manning. The Colts’ estimated advantage over the league average reduced the Patriots’ chance of winning to 60%, giving the advantage to attempting the fourth down conversion and further supporting Belichick’s call.

Did Belichick know these numbers when he made the decision? Probably not, but not knowing those numbers off hand and still making the right call merits tribute to the raw football sense which has helped win him three Super Bowls and reserve him a seat in Canton. Belichick’s decision to go for it was not a brash decision made out of arrogance, nor was it a stupid gamble. It was a calculated risk in which the odds were in his favor. In his press conference following the game, Belichick said he thought the call to go for it “gave his team the best chance to win.” And he was right. Unfortunately, the cards didn’t fall his way.